Efficient Use of Prices and Quantity Constraints for Control and Coordination of Linear Sectoral Production Models by Podkaminer, L.
Efficient Use of Prices and Quantity 
Constraints for Control and 
Coordination of Linear Sectoral 
Production Models
Podkaminer, L.
IIASA Working Paper
WP-81-110
August 1981 
Podkaminer, L. (1981) Efficient Use of Prices and Quantity Constraints for Control and Coordination of Linear Sectoral 
Production Models. IIASA Working Paper. WP-81-110 Copyright © 1981 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/1651/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF THE AUTHOR 
EFFICIENT USE OF PRICES AND QUANTITY 
CONSTRAINTS FOR CONTROL AND COORDIN- 
ATION OF LINEAR SECTORAL PRODUCTION 
MODELS 
Leon Podkaminer 
August, 1981 
WP-81-110 
Working Papers are interim reports on work of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
and have received only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily repre- 
sent those of the Institute or of its National Member 
Organizations. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
PREFACE 
A number of complex national agricultural models with linear 
programming description of the sectors of farms have been developed. 
Intended as tools for policy analysis, these models do not clearly 
endognize the government's behaviour. However, it is interesting 
to explore the consequences and possibilities of an efficient 
utilization of the sectoral programming models for a fully con- 
scious governmental decision making. The topic is especially 
important for those centrally planned economies where the failure 
of the administrative (command) methods of management of agricul- 
ture has been unequivocally acknowledged and yet no consistent 
alternative mechanism has so far emerged. 
The paper presents a scheme for the control and coordination 
of production plans generated by the linear aggregative (sectoral) 
programs. Thereby prices and, if need be, quotas and constraints 
on input availabilities may be set in such a way as to guarantee 
the satisfaction of the governmental goals while fully respecting 
sovereignity of the profit-motivated producers. 
It has been demonstrated that prices alone, even if fully 
controlled by the government, need not lead to the satisfaction 
of the achievable government's goals. It is only with the intro- 
duction of quotas on outputs and limits on available inputs that 
the possibility of a reconciliation of the government's goals with 
the behaviour of profit-motivated sectors is recovered. However, 
the introduction of quantity restrictions imposes additional con- 
ditions that cannot be violated for fear that this would unleash 
uncontrollable speculation with respect to licences for production 
and inputs. The analytical framework for the consistent simul- 
taneous determination of prices and quantity restrictions has been 
given. This implies solving linear programming models with some 
nonconcave quadratic constraints. 
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Introduction 
The paper presents a scheme for the control and coordina- 
tion of production plans generated by the linear aggregative 
(sectoral) programs. Thereby prices and, if need be, quotas 
and constraints on input availabilities may be set in such a 
way as to guarantee the satisfaction of the governmental goals 
while fully respecting sovereignity of the profit-motivated 
producers. 
Key words: sectoral aggregative models, two-level planning, 
production control through prices and quantity 
constraints. 
A number of complex national agricultural models with linear 
programming description of the sectors of farms have been 
developed (for a list of references see McCarl and Spreen, 1980). 
Intended as tools for policy analysis, these models do not 
clearly endognize the government's behaviour. However, it is 
interesting to explore the consequences and possibilities of an 
efficient utilization of the sectoral programming models for 
a fully conscious governmental decision making. The topic is 
especially important for those centrally planned economies where 
the failure of the administrative (command) methods of manage- 
ment of agriculture has been unequivocally acknowledged and yet 
no consistent alternative mechanism has so far emerged. 
As long as the objectives that can be ascribed to the 
governments of the centrally planned economies (and the instruments 
available to them) differ from those typical in the framework 
of a market economy, the analytical framework to be of some 
appeal cannot be easily borrowed from the existing studies. 
Some of these studies (e.g. Meister, Chen and Heady, 1978) do 
not envisage any place for a governmental intervention in 
agriculture and address themselves to the context where any 
governmental intervention is in fact prohibited. Others (e.g. 
Candler, Fortuny-Amat and McCarl) consider the problem as typical 
in the concept of coordination in hierarchical systems. By 
concentrating on interaction between the separate decision 
makers at various levels of hierarchical ladder they do not pay 
sufficient attention to the possibilities of cooperation (ex- 
change) among formally unconnected (equally ranked) elements of 
the hierarchy. 
All in all, the subject of a coordinated use of both price 
and quota instruments in agricultural production policies in the 
linear programming context has not - to the author's knowledge - 
been analytically tackled so far. (Of course there has been a 
lot of constructive work on the subject of the use of these 
instruments in control of domestic consumption and international 
trade (see Keyzer, 1980). 
The question whether one specific set of governmental 
objectives and instruments make more sense than the other 
will certainly not be resolved in this paper. However, some 
conclusions concerning the limitations on both price and price- 
and-quota policies will be reached. 
1. Direct vs Indirect Control of Economic Activities 
One of the most important issues related to the operation of 
a centrally planned economy has been the design of workable 
mechanisms for allocation of resources and production targets 
among production units. At early stages of the economic develop- 
ment the allocation is decided administatively by government 
agencies (ministries) supervising the performance of production 
units. Growing sophistication of production processes (pro- 
liferation of products, inputs, technologies; deepening of 
specialization and cooperation among production units) makes 
the task of ministries increasingly difficult. Not infrequently 
the decisions appear incorrect, leading to wastage of resources 
in production units and therefore reducing the overall well- 
being of the society. 
The decline in the efficiency of the administative allo- 
cation system is accompanied by growing difficulties in enacting 
the decisions. Under the system, the production units get 
rewarded for subordination, i.e., for fulfilment of production 
targets while keeping the use of inputs within pre-determined 
confines. Accordingly, the failure to meet production-input 
targets is penalized. 
As the allocation decisions become less and less accurate, 
the corresponding reward-penalty system becomes less and less 
fair. (In particular the production targets for some units may 
not be possible to fulfil at all at given availability of inputs.) 
The "unfairness" of the reward system unleashes, in turn, 
destructive invention on the part of the production units which 
specialize in playing down their production possibilities. 
(By this they try to secure lowest possible production targets 
and highest possible input endowments so as to guarantee high 
reward for "subordination" without much real effort.) Also 
all sorts of tricks are played to rationalize failures in meeting 
the production targets (blaming weather, cooperation, incorrect 
ministry's decisions). Needless to say this way of controlling 
production causes tremendous losses at the level of particular 
production units--there is no real coherent motive for economic, 
let alone, positively innovative behaviour on the part of enter- 
prises. Typically the enterprises purposefully do not develop 
let alone utilize their potential for fear that this would cause 
an increase in expectations concerning their future activities. 
There are several theoretical proposals concerning the issue 
of improving the efficiency of the administrative system of pro- 
duction control. Most of them provide for the creation of a 
"centrally operated" optimization model which would generate the 
allocation decisions free of mistakes and inefficiences typical 
of the traditional bureaucratic routines (Lange, 1967)' 
While agreeing that the introduction of computers and 
mathematical modelling might significantly enhance the efficiency 
of the administrative allocation decisions, one must not overlook 
the fact that this will leave some basic disadvantages of the 
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original approach pretty much unchanged. There is every reason 
to believe that even under computerized and optimization- 
oriented administrative allocation procedure, the reward system 
favoring subordination (and therefore punishing insubordination) 
will push enterprises' creativity in the wrong direction. 
The real theoretical alternative to the administrative 
allocation procedure would require the introduction of the profit 
or a profit-like motive as the sole basis of the actual reward 
system for separate, otherwise independent enterprises. 
However, the profit motive has always operated within the 
framework of a market economy, where prices emerge out of rather 
uncontrollable processes with many factors (speculative, mono- 
polistic) contributing to their imperfection and leading to some 
economically and socially undesirable phenomena. 
A very large number of studies have been concerned with 
algorithms for solving the "master" optimization model in an iter- 
ative way that may be interpreted as an interactive planning 
requiring exchange of information between the governmental agency 
and the subordinate production units. Usually, the topic is 
covered by the keyword "decomposition of linear programs" (see 
Dantzig and Wolfe, 1960; Kornai and Liptak, 1965; Johansen, 1978). 
It should be observed that the "interactive" interpretation does 
not allow for purposeful misinformation. (This has been rightly 
pointed out by Malinvaud, 1972.) 
2 Since mathematical models are hypotheses, their optimum 
solutions may not work in practice just the same way as the 
simple administrative decisions have not. 
Since this way of generating prices seems incompatible with 
the basic ideals of a socialist economy, the question arises of 
how to set the prices so as to make the profit motive work, yet 
without really losing control over basic economic and social 
events. 
Theoretically, this question was "constructively" answered 
in an early work by Lange (1936). The prescription required 
construction of a mathematical model of the market, with 
separate groups of producers and consumers being described by 
separate supply-demand models derived from the assumption of 
economic behavior (i.e. maximization of profit or utility). 
Then, the computation of the economic equilibria, executed 
in a computer, would provide the government with correct 
equilibrium prices to be announced to the populations of pro- 
ducers and consumers. 
In this way, the discrepancy between "marketplace" and 
"central planning" would be eliminated. All the participants 
of the processes of the production and exchange would retain 
decision sovereignty and yet the overall result of their 
actions would be fully consistent with the social preferences 
as reflected in central planner's objectives. 
Prof. Lange's prescription implicitly accepted neoclassical 
assumptions with respect to both producers and consumers (smooth 
convex production and utility functions). Only under these 
assumptions the computation algorithm considered (tatonnement 
method) may (for some special cases) be shown to be convergent 
to a (possibly) unique equilibrium price. 
However, because in many non-neoclassical situations the 
equilibrium prices may not exist at all, or be non-unique, this 
prescription must not be taken literally. In the following con- 
siderations the general idea of Prof. Lange is followed while, 
at the same time, some non-neoclassical assumptions that can 
be attributed to the agricultural practice are fully respected. 
2. Institutional and Technical Context 
Let us consider a situation where a very large number of 
separate production units may produce the same goods while using 
the same inputs and applying virtually similar technologies. 
This is a typically agricultural context, wherein a very large 
number of farms may produce the same products (bundles of crop 
and animal produce) while using the same inputs (fertilizers, 
feedstuffs, machinery, etc.). Because of the sheer number of 
separate farms, the assumption ruling out any monopolization 
may usually be easily accepted. 
To operationalize the considerations it is necessary to 
have all the farms grouped into possibly small sets of "sectors" 
characterized by similar technological and behavioral character- 
istics (constraints) and similar resources of land, labor and 
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capital goods. As a result of the specification of homogenous 
sectors of farms it is possible to set the analysis in manage- 
able dimensions without giving up the assumption concerning the 
"atomistic" character of the whole agriculture. 
Next, it is assumed that the Government Agency supervising 
agricultural production is in fact a monowsonisticbuyer of agri- 
cultural produce and a monopolistic supplier of intermediate 
inputs for agricultural production. More precisely, the farms 
("sectors") are free to exchange both products and inputs at 
free market prices. Yet, it is assumed that the Agency is the 
ultimate buyer of the agricultural produce and the primary 
seller of the non-agricultural and some agricultural (notably 
imported feedstuffs) inputs for agriculture. Thus, the sectors 
are insulated from either real consumers of the agricultural 
produce and real producers of the inputs for agriculture. It is 
worth noting that some of the products (e.g. feedstuffs such as 
hay or grass, manure) may be treated as non-marketable inter- 
mediate inputs to be used by the producer. The Agency's and 
free-market demand for these products is equal to zero and so 
are their prices. 
In the following considerations the problems concerned 
with only short-run (yearly) situations are studied. Thus, only 
plans on production and use of intermediate inputs are assumed 
to be flexible. Questions of allocation of capital goods, 
reallocation of land, stocks of animals and labor force are 
therefore not included. However, the control mechanism for the 
long-run decisions does not, mathematically, look very different. 
From the economic point of view it is nonetheless desirable to 
consider it in some separation from the currently discussed 
problem of the short-term control of agriculture. Although the 
separation is rather partial (for the information on the profit- 
ability of various capital inputs must be taken into acconnt 
while determining the demand for various capital goods) the 
Agency's postulates concerning goals of control will clearly be 
different in the long-run situations. (These goals may relate 
more to the desired transformation of rural structure than is 
the case in the short-run situation, where they correspond 
rather to current size and structure of outputs and inputs 
attainable at given capital, land and labor availabilities.) 
Accordingly, the reallocation, investment and change-of-job 
decisions by the farmers (migration) cannot be assumed to be 
governed by the same motives as the ones that are presumably 
predominant in the short-run contexts. 
-- 
The problems of construction, identification and applications 
of "aggregative" agricultural programming models are extensively 
discussed in McCarl, Spreen (1980). 
3. Production Potential of Sectors and Whole Agriculture 
Let us suppose that the set of feasible plans on production 
and purchase of intermediate inputs is--for any sector-- 
determined by a system of linear inequalities. Generally speak- 
ing, i-th sector's plans have to satisfy the following con- 
straints: 
where xi is a vector of production activities; si is a vector of 
purchase of icputs; 
A , Bi are matrices of fixed coefficients for technical con- 
strainis (1 ) representing utilization of fixed assets (land, 
buildings, labor, etc.); bi is a vector of available fixed 
assets. Some constraints In (1) may represent behavioral 
restraints which rule out plans that the farmers consider either 
too risky or unacceptable in view of the longer-term perspective 
(e.g. regard for crop-rotation); C. is a matrix of fixed co- 
ef f icients for technical constraink (2) representing use of 
intermediate inputs. It is assumed that the sectors do not 
have significant reserves of intermediate inputs--thus the right- 
hand side of (2) is equal to zero. (In practice the sectors 
may have some reserves (especially of feedstuffs) that are kept 
for weather emergencies and are not taken into account while 
planning the utilization of production potential under "normal" 
conditions.) On the basis of the descriptions of each sector's 
production potentials it is possible to describe the potential 
of the whole agriculture. This is given by the system of 
inequalities (1 ) i (3) for all sectors: 
with additional constraints on the total use of intermediate 
inputs : 
where s is a vector of total availabilities of intermediate 
inputs at the Agency's disposal, g is a vector of fixed co- 
efficients. (These coefficients are equal one for the pro- 
ducts that can be used as marketable intermediate inputs--i.e. 
as feedstuffs such as wheat, and zero for all other products.) 
Thus, the inequalities (5) represent the balances of intermediate 
inputs--both those which are assumed to be given irrespectively 
of the agricultural production and those whose appearance 
depends on the course of the processes of agricultural produc- 
tion. 
4. Socially Optimal Utilization of the Production Potential of 
Agriculture 
~t is assumed that the Agency has clear-cut objectives with 
respect to total purchases of agricultural products and total 
sales of intermediate inputs to agriculture. 
It may be supposed that the primary objective of the Agency 
may be stated in the form of a criterion function: 
m m 
Maximize d C xi - h C si 
i=l i=l 
where d.is vector of parameters valuing particular products; 
h is vector of parameters valuing particular inputs. 
The paramaters of vectors d, h may be identified with the world 
market prices of products and inputs. (The activities represent- 
ing production of intermediate non-marketable inputs (hay, manure) 
are not included in (6), i.e. the correspondina parameters are 
equal zero. 
Alternatively, the primary goal of the Agency may be stated 
inamulti-objective fashion, as the postulate of achieving total 
production C xi approximately some vector of "ideal" total pro- 
duction 2 while keeping total use of inputs (I s.) "as small as 
possible". In this case it is also possible to tormulate a 
linear criterion function reflecting the preferences expressed 
in the statement of the "ideal" production and use of inputs: 
* The simplest formula allowing the transformation of the multi- 
objective statement of the goal into a single-objective one is 
provided by the concept of gcal programming (Kornbluth, 1973). 
A more flexible approach has been developed by Wierzbicki (1981). 
Independently of the main objective, as reflected in the 
linear critericn function (6), or any other relevant criterion 
function (whether linear or not) the Agency may require some 
minimum and maximum levels for production: 
x d C x i ' < x  
min i=, max 
where xmin, x max are vectors of fixed minima and maxima levels 
of production of particular commodities. 
By solving the optimization ("master") model with the 
criterion function (6) and the constraints (41, ( 5 )  , (7) the 
Agency determines plans for production and use of inputs in all 
sectors. These plans, denoted as (x!, sp) , if carried through 
by the sectors would guarantee a besk (from ~gency's point of 
view) utilization of the production potential of agriculture. 
NOW, the problem emerges of how to make the sectors behave in 
such a yay that their performance will eventually lead to (6) 
equal f while respecting both (5) and (7). Since we are not 
interested in the sending of direct orders to the sectors, it is 
now necessary to define a universal (applicable to all sectors) 
price system under which sectors'own optima would be also optimal 
for the Agency. 
It is interesting to note that if producers were offered world 
market prices (d, h) and (7) could be, if necessary, balanced 
through foreign trade, then maximization of (6) subject to (4) 
and (5) would yield the same solution as would be attained 
through perfect competition. However, in the presence of 
restrictions on international trade (whether implied by other 
countries import quota or the Agency's desire to preserve a 
certain level of self-sufficiency) the adoptation of world 
market prices may not, in general, be accepted even if the 
objective function (6) is specified precisely with the world 
market prices. (Later, see (16), additional requirements will 
be specified which once again may imply the need for intro- 
duction of domestic prices differing from the world market 
ones - even in the absence of restriction on the world market 
prices) . 
5. Analytical Conditions for Feasible Prices 
The i-th sector's optimum plan on production and use of 
inputs may be stated in the following way: 
maximize pxi - nsi 
where p , n are vectors of prices for products and inputs 
respectively. 
The objective function (8) is in fact net revenue: value 
of production minus value of intermediate inputs. (Because 
capital endowments, land and employment are given (and are not 
supposed to be subject to any change within the production 
period) the maximization of (8) is equivalent to maximization 
of both profit and income. Therefore, although the long-term 
objective functions for traditional agriculture may be assumed 
to be income rather than profit, in the short-term context con- 
sidered, the acceptance of (8) for any set of agricultural 
sectors seems justified. 
Let > 0, no > 0 be such that the following conditions 
are satisfied for some non-negative values for vectors 8itBit 
A A 
YitZi : 
Then, by virtue of theAFundamental I\ Theorem of the duality theory 
for linear programs, (xi, si) is an optimum solution to the 
problem (8) - (1 1 ) specified with prices ,no) . (It is worth 
noting that if no) satisfies (1 2) , (1 3) , then any price 
vsctor I\ (apO,an ) with a>o would also result in optimality of 
(xi'si). Thus, the most that can be expected from the analysis 
is (at least for the time being) the structure of prices, and 
not their absolute levels.) It follows from (1 2) that in order 
to find prices (potno) at which the rational behavior of the 
sectors may be consistent with the Agency's goals one has to 
find a solution to the system of conditions: 
5 At prices ,no ) satisfying (1 3) - (1 5) some sectoral optimi- 
zation models (8)-(11) may have multiple optima. According to 
(13)-(15), at least one of these optima is also good from the 
Agency's point of view. 
-C.X i +  I S i b  0 
~t is interesting to note that similar conditions developed 
by Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981, do not stipulate the attainment 
of the Agency's feasible optimum fO. Instead of the constraint 
h xi - d 1 si = f , the authors introduce the objective function (6) . 
1=3 i= 1 
The conditions (1 3) - (1 5) may be additionally accompanied by some 
other constraints expressing auxiliary (and yet important in 
practice) goals related to price stability and profitabilities 
of the sectors. These constraints may be stated in the form of 
inequalities: 
and 
IT T 
where Pmin' Pmaxr mint max denote limits for the acceptable 
movements in the prices of particular products and inputs; Ri 
is postulated level of revenue earned by i-th sector6. (The 
preservation of stability in prices may be important even in 
the short-term context assumed in the analysis. Namely, it is 
implied by (8)+(11), and then carried over through the following 
analysis, that the sectors do not "store" production or inputs 
in expectation of a rise in prices. This, however, may not be 
correct should the price changes determined by the Agency exhibit 
too much of a variability over time.) 
6 With the introduction of (16), the price solutions to (13)- 
(1 5) cease to be homogenous. 
6. The Existence of Feasible Prices 
The system of inequalities (1 3) - (1 5) , and therefore (1 3) - 
(16) may not have any solution. What happens in this case is 
that for one (or more) sectors any solution (xi'si) satisfying 
(-141 is placed in the interior of the set of optimum solutions 
defined by (9) - ( 1 1 ) . Other "unpleasant" situations occur when 
the solution (xi'si) satisfying (14) is placed on the boundary 
of the set of sector's feasible solutions (9)-(11), yet not at 
its vertex. (This is the case of multiplicity of optimum 
solutions mentioned already.) 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate possible cases for a pair of 
two-good examples. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed 
0 0 that for some sector i there is only one (xo ,so) =(xi, si) 
satisfying (14). (This is then the only i-th sector's plan 
acceptable to the Agency.) 
Figure 1. Possible locations of optimum (xO, sO ) in a sector's 
set of feasible solutions H. 
Optima (xO,sO) may only be - in the case considered - 
located on lines EC and CA. (All other positions would imply 
non-optimality of (xO ,so) as a part of the solution to the 
master problem.) If optimum is located at A, then any relative 
price  IT ranging from 1 to infinity is satisfactory. At C any 
relative price  IT ranging from zero to one is satisfactory. 
At B there is exactly one satisfactory price p/~, equal to one. 
However, at p / ~  = 1 any solution placed on CA is also the sector's 
optimum. At D there is no satisfactory price structure. 
IFormally, one would have to acceptp/~ 
'x  
2 
X 
1 0 2x0]  Figure 2. Possible locations of optima for products ( x , 
in sector's set of feasible sofutions H in a two- 
dimensional case. 
1 2  If optimum is located at A, then any relative price p /p 
ranging from infinity to one is satisfactory. At B there is 
1 2  
exactly one satisfactory relative price (p /p = 1 .  However, 
1 ? 
if p'/pL = 1, then any solution ranging from A to D is also the 
sector's own optimum. At C there is no satisfactory price 
structure at all. 
7. Introduction of Production Quotas and Availability Limits 
Since we have shown that prices alone may not, in general, 
be expected to guarantee the identity of sector's own optima 
with the optima for sectors7, there 1s a need for the application 
of some additional measures. There is one set of measures which 
are both very simple in nature and yet not contradictory to the 
internal sovereignty of the sectors and the preservation of the 
profit motive. This provides for the possibility of constraining 
the access to some inputs and for contractual arrangements with 
respect to some agricultural products. More precisely, the 
Agency may resort to the rationing with respect to inputs and to 
introduction of quota with respect to products to be bought from 
the sectors. 
While the meaning of the rationing is rather obvious, the 
contracting may require some more interpretation. Namely, by 
setting a contract gij on production of good j of sector i, the 
Agency obliges itself to buy from sector i any amount of good j 
not exceeding gij at given pricejp of that good. The surplus 
of production does not have any guarantee of being bought by the 
Agency at any price. At the same time, the production being less 
' The Dantzig-Wolfe (1 960) decomposition algorithm and many more 
that have followed, are sometimes interpreted in terms of a two- 
level control procedure for "allocation through prices". In view 
of the presented considerations, this interpretation is misleading. 
than fi does not imply any penalty to be applied to the sector. 
Now, i-Jh sector's optimum planning on production and use of 
inputs may be stated in the following way: 
maximize pxi - nsi 
s.t. 
where gi,Qi are quotas on purchases of production and limits on 
the sales of inputs respectively. 
Having the possibility of setting both prices ( p O , ~ O )  and 
constraints ( 8 )  for all goods and for all sectors, the 
I I 
Agency would have no problems in an efficient control of any 
sector (see Figures 3 and 4). More precisely, the constraints 
of the Agency's master program (14) - (16) would still have to be 
satisfied, with the following modification of (13): 
Figure 3. The application of a quota and (or) a limit in the 
two-dimensional case. 
* * 
By introducing quota xD and limit sD one transforms D into 
a (single) vertex of the set of feasible solutions. Any relative 
price structure p/r ranging from zero to infinity results now in 
D's unique optimality$ With respest to B one achieves the same 
by introducing quota xB and limit sB. (In the case considered 
* * 
the application of either quota xB or the limit sB is sufficient 
to transform B into a vertex of the set of feasible solutions.) 
Figure 4. The application of quotas in the two-dimensional case. 
By introducing quotas 'gc and *gc one transforms C into a 
vertex of the set of feasible solutions. With respect to B the 
2% 
same is achieved through introduction of quota or (and) IffB. 
It is quite obvious that the Agency introducing quota and 
limits for all goods and for all sectors is fully controlling 
whole agriculture. Yet, this may be both costly in terms of 
organizational effort and, in fact, unnecessary. In most cases 
one can expect only some fraction of sectoral optima to be dis- 
placed from the vertices of the respective sets of feasible 
solutions. Moreover, in the cases of optima located on hyper- 
planes it is enough to introduce constraints on some goods only 
(.see both cases B, Figures 3 and 4). Therefore, the question 
emerges of how to control the sectors with possibly small 
numbers of quantity restrictions. 
8. Preventing Undesirable Cooperation among the Sectors 
Under the complete system of contracts and rationing, 
whereby all sectors face definite quota on all products and 
definite limits for all inputs, the sectors do not have any 
reason to enter any exchange trade in inputs or products. (Of 
course, there may be a definite reason for the exchange if the 
prices are not the same for all sectors. The same may happen 
if the quotas and contracts for some sector exceed their own 
production possibilities or input needs while actively con- 
straining some other sectors' activities.) 
Under a partial system of contracts and limits, whereby 
the sectors would not face quota on all products and limits on 
all inputs, one could expect the development of an exchange 
market for products and inputs. Should such a market develop, 
the Agenc would lose effective control over the segtors. The 
* prices (py, no) announced and the quotas and limits xi, si 
imposed would not be taken at face value by the sectors. First, 
aio~g with no ) there would exist intersectoral prices 
(p,n) affecting sector's plans. Second, the quotas and limits 
would be violated by the exchange trade (which would have to be 
labelled as speculation with respect to licences for production 
and use of inputs. As a result, the overall production actually 
realized, together with actually used up inputs may have nothing 
to do with any optimum solution to the master-program. More- 
over, the constraints (5) and (or) (7) may be violated. 
Prevention of inter-sectoral speculation through admini- 
strative measures seems plainly impossible--and even not advisable 
on purely economic grounds. It would require the creation of a 
huge army of "inspectors" supervising the transportation of pro- 
ducts and inputs and seeing that no consignment missed its 
"legitimate" destination. (A crude alternative with respect to 
crop production would provide for contractual arrangements with 
respect to the acreages. In this case, there is a need for 
inspectors supervising land usage.) In actual fact, the intro- 
duction of administrative measures to enact the Agency's 
decisions with respect to a partial system of quotas and limits 
could easily lead to a restoration of a penalty-reward system 
favoring subordination and not economic behavior. 
Besides administrative, there are also economic means by 
which one can prevent undesirable "cooperation" of the sectors. 
First, it should be observed that the motive for the "fraudu- 
lent" transactions does not appear when the increase in total 
gain of the whole agriculture coming from the violation of the 
sectoral quantity restrictions is equal to zero. 
The maximum total gain of the whole agriculture with the 
sectors forming a coalition acting "against" the Agency is 
determined by the following optimization model: 
m m 
maximize p C xi - IT C si 
i= 1 i= 1 
The maximum total gain of the whole agriculture with the 
sectors following the quantity constraints imposed by the Agency 
is equal (see 16) 
Now, it is possible to form additional conditions on prices and 
quantity restrictions which will prevent the emergence of the 
motive for the fraudulent transactions. 
m * m.* 
Namely, if p , ~  C si C xi satisfy the following inequalities: 
i=l i=l 
f o r  some non-negative v e c t o r s  p i f l l i  , = m  , 6 ,  0 - t h e s e  a r e  
d u a l  v a r i a b l e s  f o r  problem (18) - (23) - then ,  by v i r t u e  of t h e  Funda- 
mental Theorem of t h e  d u a l i t y  theory  f o r  l i n e a r  programs, any o p t i -  
mum s o l u t i o n  t o  ( 1  8 )  - (23)  does no t  p rov ide  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  of s e c t o r s  
w i th  any a d d i t i o n a l  g a i n  due t o  any exchange of l i c e n c e s  f o r  pro- 
duc t ion  and i n p u t s .  
9 .  A Procedure f o r  Determination of P r i c e s  and Q u a n t i t y  Con- 
s t r a i n t s :  A Restatement 
The a n a l y t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  of p r i c e /  
q u a n t i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  s e t t i n g  presen ted  s o  f a r  may--after p roper  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - - s e r v e  a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  computat ional  
procedures.  A g e n e r a l  procedure  which seems t o  fo l low t h e  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  most n a t u r a l  way would r e q u i r e  t h e  format ion 
and numerical  a n a l y s i s  of t h r e e  master  programs. 
Master Proaram I 
This  i s  g iven  by 4 + 7 , ( 1  6 )  . Solving it one o b t a i n s  f  O .  
I f  (xf  ,x;, * * *  . x ~ , s f . s ~ ,  ,s;) i s  unique then  t h e  format ion and 
a n a l y s i s  of t h e  remaining Master Programs may be g r e a t l y  s impl i -  
f i e d . )  ( I f  Master Program I has  no f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  then  some 
of t h e  o r i g i n a l  Agency's g o a l s  cannot  be s a t i s f i e d .  Some changes 
i n  t h e  parameters  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t a r g e t s  must fo l low. )  
Master Program I1 
This  i s  given by (1  3)  - ( 1  6 )  and some ( q u i t e  a r b i t r a r y )  
o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  such a s  
m n 
minimize 1 z j f i  
i = 1  j=1 
1 , i  2 , i  n , i  
where ( z  , z  . z  ) = z  i 
( z J f i  i s  d u a l  p r i c e  of  t h e  l i m i t  f o r  i - t h  i n p u t  i n  t h e  
i - t h  s e c t o r ) .  I f  t h e r e  i s  a  f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  t o  Plaster Program 
11, then  p r i c i n g  a lone  v i r t u a l l y e  l e a d s  t o  t h e  cons i s t ency  
between t h e  Agency's g o a l s  and t h e  profi t-maximizing behavior  
of t h e  s e c t o r s .  
Master Program I11 (Formed when Xas t e r  Program I1 does  n o t  have 
any f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n . )  
This  i s  given by ( 1  4 )  (17) , ( 2 4 )  , (25) . Any f e a s i b l e  solu-  
t i o n  t o  Master Program I11 d e f i n e s  p r i c e s  and a u a n t i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  
which v i r t u a l l y a  l e a d  t o  t h e  cons i s t ency  between t h e  Agency's 
g o a l s  and t h e  profi t-maximizing behavior  of t h e  s e c t o r s .  The 
f i n a l  s e l e c t i o n  of t h e  f e a s i b l e  p r i c e s  and q u a n t i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  
Although it may be necessary  t o  ask t h e  s e c t o r s  t o  r e s t r i c t  
t h e  choice  t o  be f i n a l l y  made from t h e  sets of s e c t o r s '  own optima. 
s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  of Blaster Program I11 may be f a c i l i t a t e d  
by t h e  cho ice  of a  s u i t a b l e  o b j e c t i v e  func t ion .  L e t  u s  n o t i c e  
t h a t  s i n c e  we a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  reducing t h e  amount of q u a n t i t y  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  a c t i v e l y  c o n s t r a i n i n g  t h e  s e c t o r s '  behavior ,  w e  can 
r e q u i r e  t h a t  a s  many d u a l  p r i c e s  f o r  t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s  a s  p o s s i b l e  
be eaua l  t o  zero.  Th i s  requirement  i s  r e f l e c t e d  by t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n  
k 
minimize C E z J r i  + L w j  , i  j=3 
1 , i  2 , i  k , i  
where (w , w ,. . .. , w  ) = wi. ( w J r i  i s  d u a l  p r i c e  of t h e  quota  
on j - t h  product  f o r  s e c t o r  i ) .  
CONCLUSION 
The paper has  p re sen ted  a  scheme f o r  c o n t r o l  and coordina- 
t i o n  of p roduc t ion  p l a n s  genera ted  by t h e  l i n e a r  agg rega t ive  
( s e c t o r a l )  programs. I t  has  been demonstrated t h a t  p r i c e s  a l o n e ,  
even i f  f u l l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  government, need n o t  l e a d  t o  
t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  of t h e  ach ievab le  government 's  g o a l s .  I t  i s  
on ly  wi th  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of quo ta s  on o u t p u t s  and l i m i t s  on 
a v a i l a b l e  i n p u t s  t h a t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  of t h e  
government's g o a l s  w i th  t h e  behavior  of p ro f i t -mo t iva t ed  s e c t o r s  
i s  recovered.  However, t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of q u a n t i t y  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
imposes a d d i t i o n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  cannot  be v i o l a t e d  f o r  f e a r  
t h a t  t h i s  would un leash  u n c o n t r o l l a b l e  s p e c u l a t i o n  wi th  r e s p e c t  
t o  l i c e n c e s  f o r  p roduc t ion  and i n p u t s .  The a n a l y t i c a l  frame- 
work f o r  t h e  c o n s i s t e n t  s imul taneous de t e rmina t ion  of p r i c e s  and 
q u a n t i t y  r e s t r i c t i o n s  has  been given.  Th i s  imp l i e s  s o l v i n g  
l i n e a r  programming models w i th  some nonconcave q u a d r a t i c  con- 
s t r a i n t s .  (See Hansen, Manne, 1 9 7 8 . )  
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